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FOREIGN AFFAIRS: PRESIDENTIAL 




THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. By H. Jefferson Powell. 
Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 2002. Pp. xvii, 165. $30. 
Jefferson Powell1 is one of our foremost scholars of constitutional 
history. He is particularly adept at bringing extrajudicial sources to 
bear on constitutional issues. Owing perhaps in part to his extensive 
service in the Department of Justice, he has a special facility for the 
use of executive materials; h� is surely our leading academic expert on 
executive interpretation of the Constitution. 
· In his latest book Professor Powell applies his enviable skills to the 
recurring, fundamental, and controversial question of the division of 
authority between the President and Congress in the realm of foreign 
affairs. As is always the case when he puts the modem equivalent of 
pencil to paper, we are much the richer for his having done so. 
The Constitution, Professor Powell reminds us, is strangely 
uninformative with respect to foreign affairs (pp. 19-21). The 
President is given authority to receive foreign ambassadors and (with 
the Senate's consent) both to appoint our own and to make treaties; 
he is made Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Congress has 
power to raise and support armies and navies, to declare war, and to 
regulate foreign commerce, and it has the power of the purse. Beyond 
these fragments nothing is said about who is responsible for deter­
mining foreign policy. 
The great Professor Edward Corwin, perceiving all this, threw up 
his hands. The Constitution, he concluded, did not answer the 
question whether Congress or the President had general responsibility 
for foreign affairs; it extended to the two branches "an invitation to 
struggle" for primacy in the field.2 Professor Powell disagrees: the 
Constitution does answer the qt;iestion. It gives the President general 
* Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 
B. A. 1957, Chicago; LLB. 1960, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Law, Duke University. 
2. P. 4.; EDWARD s. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT- OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (1940); see 
id. at 26, 29, 93, 199, 304-05. 
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authority to formulate and implement foreign policy, and it gives 
Congress power to block most Presidential initiatives (pp. xiv-xv, 95, 
108-13, 139-40, 146). In other words, it leaves most questions respect­
ing foreign relations to the political process, which in Professor 
Powell's view is precisely where they belong (pp. xvi, 146, 149). 
In the domestic sphere, as Justice Black made clear in the Steel 
Seizure Case, there is no doubt that it is Congress that is supposed to 
determine national policy; it is the President's job to carry it out.3 This 
high-school-civics understanding of the separation of powers is 
confirmed, as Justice Black wrote, by the juxtaposition of Articles I 
and II of the Constitution, which vest legislative and executive 
authority in Congress and the President respectively. It is no secret 
that, as the Curtiss-Wright opinion insisted, foreign affairs do not fit 
the usual pattern - with regard to either federalism or the separation 
of powers.4 As Powell tells us, nothing in the Steel Seizure Case casts 
any shadow on this conclusion; the whole point of Justice Jackson's 
concurrence (and I would add, of Justice Black's Court opinion) was 
that the case did not involve foreign affairs (p. 24). 
True to his own model of scholarship, Professor Powell does not 
stop with sparse and inconclusive judicial pronouncements on the 
breadth of presidential authority over international relations; he goes 
back to the beginning. The debates of the Constitutional Convention, 
as he says, provide little assistance, and those of the state ratifying 
conventions are no better; the delegates had other issues on their 
minds (pp. 22, 31). The Federalist, on the other hand, he finds sugges­
tive: in discussing the treaty power, in particular, Publius stressed the 
necessity for unity, expedition, and confidentiality5 and the compara­
tive advantage of the Executive in providing them. 
But the centerpiece of Professor Powell's argument is his convinc­
ing demonstration, largely from executive materials, that a political 
rainbow of the most important members of the founding generation -
including George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas 
Jefferson, James Madison, and John Marshall - agreed in reading the 
Constitution to give the President broad authority to take the initia­
tive in foreign affairs. After a flurry of debate, for example, the early 
3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). Professor Powell 
rightly notes that over the years Justice Jackson's more nuanced concurring opinion has 
been more popular with scholars than Black's "opinion of the Court," p. 24, but for me 
Black captured a basic truth about the primacy ·of legislative responsibility for domestic pol­
icy that the later Supreme Court, malgre its protestations, seems to have recognized once 
again in the so-called item-veto case, Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
4. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Professor Powell is 
of course right that Curtiss-Wright actually held only that a particular delegation of authority 
to the President was constitutional. P. 23. 
5. Pp. 31-34; see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 31, 70, 72, 84 ( Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 3, 
4, 64 (John Jay), Nos. 41, 45 (James Madison). 
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Congress left it to President Washington to determine to which 
countries diplomatic officers should be appointed, and all his advisers 
thought Congress was right to do so (pp. 43-47). In their celebrated 
debate over Washington's audacious Neutrality Proclamation, both 
Hamilton and Madison agreed that the President enjoyed broad 
authority over foreign relations; Madison's only concern was that 
Washington might have trespassed upon Congress's exclusive author­
ity to declare war (pp. 48-51). In the famous controversy over the Jay 
Treaty, President Washington defied a demand by the House of 
Representatives for his instructions to Chief Justice Jay on the ground 
that foreign affairs were none of the House's business, and the House 
did nothing to enforce its demand (pp. 66� 76). In defending what 
opponents attacked as presidential interference with judicial pro­
ceedings respecting the extradition of Jonathan Robbins, Marshall, in 
an 1800 speech even his adversaries praised to the skies, insisted that 
the question whether to extradite an alleged fugitive was committed to 
the Executive and that the entire subject of foreign intercourse had 
been placed in presidential hands (pp. 79-88). In short, Professor 
Powell concludes, "Washington and his associates and immediate 
successors" all agreed that "the president determines, at least as an 
initial matter, what the foreign policy of the United States is to be" -
relying in part upon the textual argument that this authority was 
embraced within the "executive Power" vested in him by Article II 
and in part upon the functional argument, previously adumbrated in 
the Federalist, of the "need for an effective system of making and 
implementing foreign policy" (pp. 93-94). 
Insofar as this message concerns three of the four central compo­
nents of foreign policy that Professor Powell defines for us in a much­
appreciated appendix (pp. 152-55) - recognition, negotiation, and the 
confidentiality of diplomatic information - I should think it rather 
difficult to take issue with his conclusions. As he says, his basic thesis 
appears to find support in the text, in the original understanding, in 
early constitutional practice, in "its fit with the necessary institutional 
relations between the political branches," and in "the consequences 
which it entails" (p. 30). Indeed qne is tempted, if that is all there is to 
foreign affairs, to protest that the ostensible silences of the Framers 
are largely illusory: recognition is implicit in the decision whether to 
receive ambassadors, negotiation in treatymaking, and confidentiality 
in the activity to be concealed. 
There is, however, a fourth �l�ment in Professor Powell's concep­
tion of foreign affairs: the protection of national security. It is a grave 
mistake, he argues, to treat the allocation of authority over military 
matters as analytically distinct from that over foreign relations: 
"[Q]uestions about the locus of authority over national security and 
the use of the armed forces should start not froin 'clause-bound inter­
pretation' of particular constitutional provisions, but from an overall 
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understanding of the Constitution of foreign affairs" (p. 154). And 
that understanding, Professor Powell contends, leads to the conclusion 
that "the president has a constitutional responsibility, independent of 
any act of Congress[,] to preserve the physical safety and international 
interests of the United States against foreign threat" (p. 154). 
It is here, I believe, that Professor Powell's thesis will encounter 
the greatest resistance. For he acknowledges, as his treatment of 
Madison's position on the Neutrality Act suggests, that the war powers 
present a special case (pp. 51, 93, 139). It could hardly be otherwise. 
Powell agrees that the explicit and substantial powers granted to 
Congress in this field qualify the President's general authority over 
foreign affairs - as Justice Jackson, whose Steel Seizure opinion he 
especially admires, insisted they qualified the "clause-bound" author­
ity of the Commander in Chief. As usual, however, the devil is in the 
details, and Professor Powell seems willing to concede the President 
greater competence to initiate or risk hostilities than some of us may 
think consistent with the constitutional plan. 
His bottom line, though hedged about with hints of serious defini­
tional controversy, should command wide assent: "If the anticipated or 
actual severity, scope or duration of hostilities rises to the level of 
'war' in a constitutional sense, congressional authorization is constitu­
tionally necessary" (p. 139). For he agrees, as he must, that the clause 
giving Congress authority to declare war "sets some sort of outer 
boundary on the president's ability to use the commander in chief 
power to pursue sheerly executive-branch policies" (p. 121). He rightly 
adverts in this connection to "founding-era concern about unilateral 
presidential power to involve the United States in war" (p. 121) and to 
the deliberate decision of the Framers to transfer to Congress signifi­
cant war powers that in England had belonged to the King.6 He does 
not make the unsustainable claim that the President is free to wage 
war at will so long as he does not formally declare it. 
Mr. Powell's claim of presidential authority is more modest. "The 
ability to warn of, or threaten, the use of military force is an ordinary 
and essential element in the toolbox of that branch of government 
empowered to formulate and implement foreign policy," he argues, 
and the threat of force would be hollow if its implementation 
"depended in every instance on congressional approval" (p. 119). 
Thus: 
6. P. 113; see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69 ( Alexander Hamilton); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 
397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) ("We have already given in example one effectual check to 
the Dog of war by transferring the power .of letting him loose from the Executive to the 
Legislative body . ... "). 
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the argument that military action must always be authorized in advance 
by Congress is erroneous, and not only in those circumstances in which 
the president is responding to a direct attack on the United States .... 
If Congress provides the president with the wherewithal, and if Con­
gress leaves the president legally unfettered, the president has the prima 
facie power to employ military force in the pursuit of foreign policy ob­
jectives. (pp. 119-20) 
Congress's sweeping powers to deny the President the necessary 
resources and restrict the purposes for which they may be used take 
much of the sting out of this conclusion; Professor Powell insists that 
Congress, if it chooses, may have the last word (pp. 120-21 ). 
Otherwise, he argues, in accord with an opinion of the Office of Legal 
Counsel respecting the dispatch of armed forces to Haiti in 1994, 
the question of presidential authority is one of degree: "The use of 
military force is a tool of foreign policy, but at some point of severity, 
it implicates the American people in a fashion that demands the 
approval of their elected legislators as well as their elected president."7 
Those who recall the strenuous argument over congressional and 
presidential war powers during the Vietnam controversy may perhaps 
be forgiven if they question Mr. Powell's conclusion as to where to 
draw the line. For it was common currency at the time, and has 
remained so ever since, to understand the familiar decision of the 
Constitutional Convention to authorize Congress to "declare war" 
rather than to "make war" as drawing a distinction between defensive 
and aggressive action. That is indeed how it was explained by Madison 
and Elbridge Gerry, who proposed it: the Executive should be permit­
ted (and who would dispute it?) "to repel sudden attacks."8 It is true, 
as Professor Powell points out, that Roger Sherman is reported as 
having doubted that the terminology they proposed would do the trick 
(p. 116), but that seems to me not to leave the Framers' intentions 
quite so murky as the author depicts them (pp. 116-17). 
To sustain his rejection of· Madison and Gerry's distinction, 
Professor Powell again relies heavily on early practice, the relevance 
of which I should be the last to deny.9 There may nevertheless be 
room for disagreement as to the l�ssons that practice imparts. 
7. P. 122; see 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173, 179 (1994). 
8. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
9. From the beginning the Supreme Court has relied on early practice as evidence of 
what the Constitution means. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824); 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 (1 
Wheat.) U.S. 304, 351-52 (1816). That does not mean, of course, that the early practice was 
never mistaken. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803) (rejecting the 
First Congress's apparent interpretation of the Article III provision respecting the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction). 
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Professor Powell's historical case for presidential authority to risk 
or initiate hostilities rests essentially on two early examples: efforts to 
enforce President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation and 
President Jefferson's attempts to deal with the notorious Barbary 
pirates. 10 Both are of first importance to anyone who wishes to under­
stand the war powers, and I shall say a few words about each of them. 
After warning that he would prosecute those who offended 
American neutrality by supporting French war efforts in the conflict 
that followed that country's Revolution (on the debatable premise 
that international laws were among those whose execution the 
President was expected to ensure and at the arguable expense of 
poaching on congressional authority to define offenses against the law 
of nations), Washington directed the Governors of the several states 
to stop them (raising interesting questions of his authority to employ 
the militia to execute the laws without, so far as appears, complying 
with the formalities prescribed by the governing statute). Then, when 
the Little Sarah was all fitted out and ready to sail in defiance of the 
Proclamation, the Cabinet - in Washington's absence - agreed he 
had power to use force to detain the ship, and the President issued 
orders requiring the Governors to do just that in future cases (pp. 53-
59). 
I do not believe it can be said that this revealing incident suggests a 
consensus within the Administration that the President had general 
authority to formulate and execute foreign policy; each step in the 
saga appears to follow logically from Washington's initial decision that 
he had a specific duty to enforce the law of nations. It does seem to 
demonstrate, however, that both the President and his Cabinet 
thought neither Congress's war powers nor the concerns that lay 
behind them precluded the Executive under the circumstances from 
using force against a vessel in the service of a foreign nation - and 
not merely, Professor Powell emphasizes, when it acted in self-defense 
(pp. 57, 60-61). 
The second incident is more quickly told: President Jefferson 
risked war by sending Navy vessels to protect United States shipping 
in the Mediterranean and (contrary to what he told Congress in asking 
for authority to retaliate) ordered aggressive action against Tripoli in 
response to its declaration of war (pp. 91-93). 
10. He also invokes Jefferson's hard-nosed conduct toward France in pursuit of his 
policy of keeping French troops off the Mississippi River, pp. 90, 119, which included the 
threat of a United States alliance with Great Britain. Like President Monroe when he issued 
his famous edict against European intervention in the New World, Jefferson was plainly 
playing with fire, as was President Polk in his later belligerent posture toward the British 
with respect to Oregon. In none of these instances, however, do I recall any suggestion that 
the President thought he had authority actually to initiate hostilities without congressional 
approval. 
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Of these two incidents, that of the Little Sarah strikes me as the 
more damaging to the conventional distinction between offensive and 
defensive action. Yes, the President was simply enforcing the law of 
nations, which (on his assumption that it was one of the laws he was 
supposed to enforce) was mere fulfillment of his explicit constitutional 
outy. Yet in so doing he came perilously near to employing armed 
force against a sovereign nation, which looks very much like initiating 
war. And that grave step, the popular theory assures us, may be taken 
only by Congress. I I 
Jefferson's actions against Tripoli seem far easier to reconcile with 
the traditional distinction. To begin with, what he told Congress was a 
classic exposition of that theory: only Congress, he argued, might 
authorize anything beyond self-defense - even in retaliation for an 
alleged attack on the United States Navy. What Jefferson said may be 
more important than what he did, for it suggests he thought the 
country would not accept a broader interpretation of presidential 
power. In addition, even his actions conformed to the essence of that 
principle, which Hamilton himself in his attack on Jefferson's self­
denying message accepted: only Congress may initiate martial conflict. 
When Jefferson sent ships to the Mediterranean it was for strictly de­
fensive purposes; surely the power to protect American shipping in­
cludes authority to move men-of-war into positions where they can re­
spond to actual attacks.12 And when his commanders finally took 
aggressive action it was in reply to the enemy's declaration of war -
raising questions only of the extent of presidential authority to re­
spond to foreign aggression, not of Congress's monopoly on initiating 
offensive action. 
But my principal reservation about Professor Powell's use of 
history with respect to presidential war powers is its selectivity. For 
there are a surprising number of early extrajudicial precedents on the 
subject, many of which go unmentioned. And although the later 
history, as the Fulbright Committee graphically demonstrated, reveals 
a disturbing drift of warmaking authority from Congress to the 
11. It should be noted that President Jefferson took no such step in the later and more 
famous case of the British attack on the Chesapeake but soberly referred the question of re­
prisals to Congress, although it was a plain case of self-defense, saying that the decision 
"[w]hether the outrage is a proper cause of war" was one "belonging exclusively to Con­
gress." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William H. Cabell (June 29, 1807), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 432, 433 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 126-27, 147 
(2001) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS]. 
12. Compare President Polk's dispatch of troops to what he considered the Texas bor­
der in the face of the obvious risk (which became reality) of provoking a Mexican attack. 
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 
1845-1861, at ch. 2 (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter CURRIE, DESCENT INTO THE 
MAELSTROM]. 
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Executive,13 the bulk of the early material tells quite another story. 
Moreover, even on those rare occasions when early Presidents 
arguably did initiate hostilities against foreign powers, they almost 
invariably argued that they were acting either defensively or to carry 
out some legislative command. 
The Tripolitan incident, I have suggested, was a part of this tradi­
tion. So was President Washington's earlier explicit refusal, on consti­
tutional grounds, to send troops to fight troublesome Indians on the 
Georgia frontier: only Congress, he told the importunate Governor, 
could empower him to take offensive action. Similarly, when Andrew 
Jackson, in pursuit of marauding Seminole Indians who had taken 
refuge beyond the border, took possession of Spanish forts in Florida, 
President Monroe emphatically disowned him: not even the President 
could lawfully commit an act of war against a foreign state. The 
belligerent Monroe Doctrine, warning European powers to keep their 
hands off the Western Hemisphere, was attacked as usurping 
congressional authority by creating a risk of war; Monroe's successor 
defended it on the ground that in reiterating the Doctrine he had 
neither the competence nor the intention to commit the United States 
to war. On similar grounds President Tyler refused to promise to 
defend Texas before its annexation, and President Fillmore refused to 
defend Hawaii or Santo Domingo. President Madison asserted that he 
was following congressional orders in occupying West Florida, 
President Polk that Mexico had invaded the state of Texas. President 
Pierce employed force in Greytown against what he dismissed as a 
band of private adventurers, not a sovereign nation; President 
Buchanan pleaded for congressional support with the assertion that he 
could not so much as fire a gun to protect American interests abroad 
without congressional sanction. There were occasional exceptions,14 
but the pattern seems clear: the President might make warning noises 
that risked war, but the official position down to the Civil War was 
that only Congress could initiate hostilities against a foreign power. 
Against this array of precedent, the Little Sarah incident seems to me 
to pale considerably. However President Washington and his advisers 
may have justified the dangers of war they were prepared to assume in 
that case, it cannot in my opinion outweigh the abundance of early 
authority against presidential initiation of actual hostilities. 
13. See S. REP. No. 90-797 (1967). 
14. President Pierce sent the Navy to Panama to enforce perceived American rights, and 
President Fillmore authorized reprisals against the authorities of the island of Johanna, in 
the Indian Ocean. These and the other incidents noted in the text are discussed in DA YID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 55-
115, 172-238 (1997); CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 11, at 123-55, 191-218; and 
CURRIE, DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, supra note 12, at chs. 2-3. 
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Toward the end of·his book Professor Powell speaks briefly to a 
collage of specific issues regarding the allocation of power over 
foreign affairs - including the War Powers Resolution, the role of the 
courts in interpreting the relevant law, the effect of executive agree­
ments, and the locus of authority to terminate treaties (pp. 122-38). 
Granting that the main purpose of this slim volume lies elsewhere, one 
may still regret that he did not expand his treatment of some of these 
topics ever so slightly. In the discussion of treaty abrogation by statute 
or by unilateral executive action, for example, I miss acknowledgment 
and evaluation of a third possibility suggested by the constitutional 
text and both practiced and defended in the mid-nineteenth century 
controversy over a commercial convention· with Denmark: that 
treaties are to be unmade, as they are made, by the President with the 
Senate's consent.15 Similarly, in connection with executive agreements, 
I should have been pleased to encounter a reminder that the require­
ment that treaties be endorsed by an extraordinary Senate majority, 
like the vesting of war powers in Congress, was a considered and 
deliberate restriction of presidential authority. Finally, while I agree 
with much that Professor Powell has to say about the War Powers 
Resolution, I would not have dismissed so quickly the provision 
requiring the President to withdraw military forces on congressional 
command as an obvious violation of the rule against legislative vetoes 
established in INS v. Chadha.16 For as I understand the record of the 
Constitutional Convention, the President's inherent power is essen­
tially to prevent irreparable harm until Congress can make the policy 
decision whether or not to wage war; the declaration of both Houses 
that the President should desist, like a simple pronouncement that 
Congress is ready to exercise its constitutional responsibility, may 
arguably be enough to show that of its own force the President's 
authority has expired. 
If I have gone out of my way to find issues on which there may be 
room to differ with Professor Powell's conclusions, that is not to 
disparage but rather to underline the challenging nature of his book. 
The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs is an important contri­
bution to a continuing debate, and one that deserves to be taken 
seriously. It is not, like so much else in this highly charged field, a 
mere polemic. It is a careful, knowledgeable, measured, thoughtful, 
sure-footed, reliable, responsible, and even modest investigation of a 
difficult question by a scholar who takes both law and history seriously 
and for whom, as my colleagues of the Supreme Court Review once 
admiringly wrote of the late Gerald Gunther, the Constitution is a 
15. See CURRIE, DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, supra note 12, at ch. 1. 
16. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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guide and not a tool.17 When I read Professor Powell's work, I invaria­
bly learn something about our constitutional history I did not know, 
and I see what I did know from a new perspective. Professor Powell 
wastes neither words nor his readers' time, and he writes very well. 
Anyone who has the slightest interest in his important subject should 
read this book. 
Professor Powell has since completed yet another study of consti­
tutional history that has just been published.18 It is, if anything, even 
more ambitious and challenging than the present volume, and the 
inquiring reader would be well advised to scarf it up as well. 
17. See p. ix. Professor Powell purports to give us not a definitive answer to the question 
of presidential power but "only the best answer" based upon legal and historical evidence. P. 
5. 
18. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002). 
